O n December 10, 2012, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration released annual statistics on traffic fatalities in the United States. The summary report emphasized that the fatality rate had decreased to a historic low of 1.10 deaths per 100 million vehicle-miles traveled. 1 The top graphic vividly showed a 75% decline in traffic risks during the last 4 decades in the United States (Figure 1 ). In the accompanying press release, then Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood summarized, ''The latest numbers show how the tireless work of our safety agencies and partners, coupled with significant advances in technology and continued public education, can really make a difference on our roadways.'' 2 These data suggest a large and sustained improvement in road safety, reassuring to motorists, regulators, and expert commentators.
The purpose of this editorial is to review misunderstandings that can occur when assessing traffic risks as a ratio of total deaths to total travel distances. At a casual glance, for example, the summary statistic immediately inserts the qualifier ''per million'' into the expression. Doing so creates an intuitive impression of a miniscule magnitude (verging on comparisons to a 1 per million risk of being killed by lightning each year). The remainder of the expression is sufficiently arcane that people may not notice that traffic risks in the United States are now about 80% higher than the same statistics from the United Kingdom. 3 The large point is that the thousands of deaths each year might merit attention regardless of how they are correlated to driving distances. 4 To be sure, traffic risks increase if motorists travel longer distances. However, the relationship of crash risk to travel distance is complex because longer trips channel vehicles toward controlled protected roads and away from crowded complex intersections. The risks of death with airplane travel, for perspective, are rarely calculated as a ratio of deaths per vehiclemile since the dangers are concentrated around takeoff and landing with much lower risks during intervening distances. Integrating traffic fatalities with community mobility is logical since the risks of a traffic crash would be zero if all persons were stationary. The difficulty arises because no exposure metric is ideal and the summary statistic presumes that all miles were identical.
Most other common causes of death in the United States are reported as plain trends despite known cause-and-effect relationships with exposures. From 2000 to 2010, for example, annual deaths from colorectal cancer decreased by 9% (from 57,434 to 52,045) and annual cigarette consumption decreased by 31% (from 435.6 billion to 300.4 billion). 5, 6 Cancer control agencies, however, are unlikely to gauge progress by calculating a metric of ''cancer deaths per million cigarettes.'' Instead, summary statistics focus on actual counts of deaths, sometimes accompanied by simple adjustments for population size and demographics. The metric of ''deaths per million vehicle miles'' is thereby irregular and perhaps dehumanizing.
Another misconception arises when public transit mobilizes a large number of people using a small number of vehicles. For example, shifting 5 individual adults from 5 separate automobiles into 1 larger conveyance will directly reduce the number of vehicle-miles traveled. The same shift will also reduce the potential for a crash among the 5 original separate vehicles. Depending on whether the numerator and denominator shrink to the same degree, the net result may show no observed change in the ratio of total deaths to total vehicle-miles and no appreciation of the safety gains from public transit. The equivalent misconception might also lead to discounting car-pooling, school buses, subway systems, and other forms of mass transit. 7 The current vehicle distance traveled in the United States is about 3 trillion miles annually. This is an astronomically large number that is impossible to measure precisely (equal to traveling 800 times from the sun to Pluto). Instead, the estimate is based on sampling a few roads and extrapolating observations by an array of conversion factors (also known as ''expansion factors''). The current estimate is largely based on about 5000 automatic traffic recorders located in major thoroughfares with occasional supplementation by manual counts from smaller roads. Such travel estimates are susceptible to reporting bias, are difficult to validate, underwrite federal tax subsidies, and ultimately underpin all statistics of vehicle-miles traveled. 8 The ratio of deaths per vehicle-mile statistic also cloaks a deeper enigma: namely, why travel distances appear to have changed so much. Some of the growth reflects increased population size and vehicle reliability; however, a large component is entirely due to long-distance commercial trucking that now accounts for about one-third of the total vehicle-miles in the United States. 9 In contrast, travel distances for passenger vehicles have remained relatively stable. Because commercial drivers have low crash risks and because their journeys are routed away from population centers, the estimated traffic risks would be substantially different if based on a median rather than average travel distance (or restricted to passenger vehicle-miles). Even more curious anomalies can arise because an aggregated ratio can camouflage all sorts of individual truths (a collection of counterintuitive statistical puzzles termed Simpson's Paradox). 10 International health comparisons are always problematic due to differences in definitions, surveillance, and accounting in different countries. Defining traffic risks as the ratio of deaths to travel distances, however, almost guarantees that a statistical comparison would be invalid (and therefore discounted). The United States and Israel, for example, would seem closely similar if described by traffic deaths per 100 million vehicle-miles (1.1 v. 1.1, respectively) instead of traffic deaths per million population annually (104 v. 44, respectively). 11 This is one reason why the World Health Organization calculates multiple indices and generally avoids the deaths per vehicle-mile statistic when evaluating traffic safety. In the most recent World Health Organization report, for example, the United States had more traffic fatalities than all other United Nations top 20 developed countries combined. 12 One final misinterpretation occurs because a ratio statistic is not actually a probability estimate when the numerator and denominator derive from different sources. All production statistics that compare inputs to outputs are prone to this misinterpretation. For example, the Beatles wrote about 230 total songs during their 10-year history; however, this observed correlation does not imply that another 23 more songs would have been written if the group had stayed together for 1 more year. A production ratio statistic provides a useful summary because it yields a descriptive comparison based on the straightforward arithmetic of dividing total deaths by total driving distance. A production ratio becomes misleading when it obscures the other factors necessary to produce a final outcome (such as individual human performance).
The risks of a traffic crash are important for informing public policy around the allocation of scarce resources that might go toward injury control. 13 The misunderstandings when interpreting traffic deaths in relation to travel distance do not nullify the statistic as one potentially useful indicator (similar to GDP as an imperfect yet still useful economic indicator). The main problem arises when policy focuses heavily on this one ratio and neglects other data around mortality, morbidity, and economic losses. 14 An awareness of specific limitations might help decision makers better interpret trends, avoid misunderstandings, and plan more cost-effective interventions. 15 Ultimately, a panel of scientific statistics (Table 1) is needed to comprehend the tragic losses from motor vehicle trauma suffered by American families. 
